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I
My objective in this paper is to discuss assumptions and implications of the first
major interpretation of Fichte`s philosophy in Brazil. I am thinking here on the
doctoral thesis defended by Rubens Torres Filho at the University of São Paulo (USP) in
1972 and also published as a book in 1975, entitled O Espírito e a Letra – A Crítica da
Imaginação Pura, em Fichte (The Spirit and the Letter - The Critique of Pure Imagination in
Fichte) (São Paulo, Ática, 1975, 272p.).
As preliminary steps to achieve this objective, it is worthwhile examining the
interpreter’s intentions and subsequently make a few remarks about the intellectual
constellation to which the book's writing and its publication belong.
But, before this, let me speak briefly comment on the author himself. Rubens Rodrigues
Torres Filho (Botucatu, Brazil, 1942) finished his bachelor in philosophy at the
University of São Paulo in 1963. He concluded his doctorate in 1972, under the initial
supervision of José A. Giannotti. He was a professor at the Philosophy department of
Usp between 1965 and 1994. During this period, he produced much recognized
translations of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Nietzsche and Novalis. He was also an essayist
and poet (he won the Jabuti Award for poetry with O voo circunflexo in the year of 1981).
He currently lives in São Paulo.
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II
Here, I'll just dwell on the 1975 book O espírito e a letra. To identify his purposes, it is
worthwhile examining how the interpreter inscribed his research on the imagination
in Fichte’s philosophy within the framework of the studies on Fichte in the 1960s.
Despite the influence that French philosophical historiography had on University of
São Paulo’s department (I will return to this point later), Rubens' book does not follow
Martial Gueroult's studies on Fichte. One could even claim the opposite: although he
quotes him in a complimentary manner in a note in the middle of the book (TORRES
FILHO, 1975, p. 128), Rubens moves away from the idea, dear to Gueroult, that the
thinking of Fichte is understandable only if one takes into account his evolution and
refinement1. Quite on the contrary, Rubens follow Fichte to the letter regarding the
coherence of his work, as he puts it, and it is from this point on that we can measure
the controversial scope of his interpretation concerning the international state of the
art. 
It is known how Hegel, in The Difference of the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling
(1801), characterizes Fichte`s position as that of the subjective idealist based on the 
Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre (1794). One of the responses to this was to
defend that, with the evolution of his thought, Fichte would have revised the point of
view defended in 1794 and replaced the absolute self by the absolute Wissen as the
principle of his system. The other response to Hegel ("more comprehensive ", as
Rubens puts it2) went on to show that the exhibition of 1794 had a simple propaedeutic
and preparatory function in relation to the Doctrine of Science itself, whose well-
finished exhibition corresponded to the 1804 version. This is the interpretation
defended by Reinhard Lauth, who produced a real inflection in the studies on Fichte3.
One can see that, by sticking to Fichte's statements about the continuity of his work
from 1794 to 1801, Rubens engaged in polemical debate not only with M. Gueroult, but
also with R. Lauth and, indirectly, A. Philonenko. And, besides them, by reintegrating
the Grundlage of 1794 into the whole corpus, he took Fichte's party against Hegel's
reading, as is clear in this step:
Neither provisional as a doctrine of science, nor definitive as the foundation of a
doctrine  of  future  science,  this  text  [VBF:  the  Grundlage]  then  conserves  its
enigmatic nature. And there's no choice but to try to undestand by one self, without
wanting to find its key away from it, even if that leads to not taking into account his
Hegelian image — which might well be more illuminating regarding the thought
and the genius of the reader than about the originality of the text. 4
A strong thesis, therefore, that sought to measure itself with that which was the best in
the contemporary international debate on Fichte. In my opinion, this boldness was only
possible because Rubens Torres Filho took advantage of the internal debate that
animated the Department of Philosophy of the University of São Paulo, which, in the
60s, consolidated itself as a center of seriousness and rigor in philosophical researches,
against the style of bacharelesque philosophy which until 1950 enjoyed hegemony in
the country. Let's see, then, in its general lines, which were the main interpretative
lines working at the end of the 50s and in the course of the 60s, when Rubens did
practically all of his Bildung.
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III
The one who most dedicated himself to this was Paulo Arantes, he himself being a
contemporary of Rubens and the author of an important book on Hegel, his doctoral
thesis of 1975, published in 19815. Reviewing the trajectory of the Department from the
30s until the 60s, Paulo Arantes insists on the importance that the French mission,
composed by professors such as Jean Maugué, Lévi- Strauss, Gilles Gaston Granger,
Michel Debrun and Gérard Lebrun6, played among brazilian teachers and students.
Differences aside, the presence of these professors consolidated the professionalization
of philosophy as academic knowledge, dealing with philosophical works with a less
ideologically biased attitude, which claimed to return to the texts and their "internal
truth". The backbone of this novelty was the structural method, practiced by French
historiography and presented by Victor Goldschmidt in a sort of methodological
summary translated in Brazil in 1963 by Oswaldo Porchat7, who was then one of the
prominent professors.
As Paulo Arantes rightly points out, the structural method, by making from "the
reading of classics the only way of learning to philosophize", was, in truth, "an
institutional adaptation of the remote Kantian maxim that it is not possible to teach
philosophy, but only to philosophy. According to P. Arantes, by excluding from the list
of explanations in the text the analysis of the elements belonging to the "historical
time", the structural method became an "effort of internal understanding [...] that
turns its back to the raw material of social experience"8. But, assuming the Kantian
point of view, one might wonder if debugging the philosophical teaching of the
doxographic bias (“Plato said this, Aristotle, that”, etc.) implies turning one`s back to
the social reality. The original Kantian intention was the opposite: to achieve neutrality
in relation to the dogmas of the philosophies of the past was, according to Kant, the
condition for thinking freely and thus for standing in the world with autonomy. To
verify the importance that this had in Kant's eyes, one has only to remember the
physical geography and anthropology courses that he gave throughout his teaching
career. This link between free reflection and practical positioning, incidentally,
remained alive in German culture, at least until Fichte.
Whether or not this pedagogical ideal took place during this period is another story. It
is certain that the realization of this correlation is not automatic. In France, for
example, it consolidated itself throughout the Third Republic (1870-1940),
accompanying a certain pedagogical ideal that attributed to philosophy an aufgeklärt
role. One can see, as an illustration, the tribute made by M. Gueroult, back in 1963, for
Xavier Léon in the “French Society of Philosophy”:
Il incarnait dans sa plus grande pureté l’idéal républicain de l’époque, idéal d’une
communauté de citoyens libres, s’éducant les uns les autres dans l’ exercice de la
liberté, travaillant d’une même âme à l’accroissement et à la diffusion de la science,
idéal optimiste de progrés et de vertu dont il croyait avoir trouvé le modèle dans
son auteur préféré.9
It is easy to imagine why the implementation of the structural method taken from
France in São Paulo was, at the least, peculiar. Brazilian politics in the 60s had
everything but republicanism and liberal ideas. It should be add to this the fact that the
national academic environment was incipient, reducing itself to a few irradiation
centers in an essentially illiterate country. The "community of free citizens educating
each other for the exercise of liberty", which, in the France of M. Gueroult, ensured the
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linkage between free thinking and well-reflected world positioning, was the social
presupposition of the Kantian maxim that we missed here.
 
IV
How can the recollection of this context (here, very badly drawn) assist to read Rubens'
book on Fichte? I see two points following from this.
1 Let's take in consideration the remark of Paulo Arantes, when he says that the
adoption of the structural method in Brazil has professionalized philosophy, but at the
price of distancing the philosophical studies of Brazilian intellectual and political life. It
should be noted that the need to be limited to the internal structure of the text has not
been passively accepted. The most widely held examination suggests the opposite:
there were many of theoretical choices which, although not abandoning the structural
reading of the texts, clearly set out to overcome them. This purpose is central to
Rubens' book on Fichte and ist evident already in his title: the spirit and the letter.
Starting from the statement made by Fichte in the Wissenschaftslehre of 1794, according
to which "the doctrine of science is such that it cannot be communicated in the letter
but only in the spirit"10, Rubens puts forward the idea that the work of Fichte requires
the transgression of the structural reading, at least in its current meaning:
Anyone who wanted to study the system only in its objectivity, solely in its textual
reality, without considering the status that Fichte confers to such objectivity, would
risk joining, under his criticism, those who read literally these sad and dangerous
`lyricists'  (Buchstabler)  that  he  complains  about  so  asperously.  (...)  this  would
happen not  because the Fichtean text  does  not  lend itself  or  refuses  itself  to  a
structural-type  of  analysis,  but  because  this  structural  analysis  would  be
insufficient as such. It would leave aside a piece of data from the structure that is
being  examined,  namely  the  fact  that  this  structure  gives  an  account  of  the
relationship between literality and that which necessarily goes beyond it.  To be
complete, this analysis does not have the right to forget this. On the contrary, it
should  be  able  to  explain  why  such  a  structure  would  be  refractory  to  an
explanation according to the order of reasons. It should therefore explain this
agility of a text which, because of the operability of certain concepts, which are at
stake, could become inaccessible to purely textual analysis (my emphasis)11.
In this way, by relativizing the "explanation according to the order of reasons", Rubens
attenuated what, according to Paulo Arantes, was implied by the structuralist method,
especially the creation of a "historical vacuum around philosophical discourse, whose
autonomy should be preserved".12 However, in which direction does the overcoming of
the internal order demanded by Rubens in his interpretation of Fichte point? In the
direction of the author's "truth": Fichte himself conceived his work as inseparable from
the bias mobilized by each of his listeners or readers. Thus, Rubens ensures that the
resumption of the text by the transcendental imagination of its recipient is the
condition sine qua non for the understanding of the Wissenschaftslehre. In Fichte’s words,
the fundamental ideas of the doctrine of science "must be produced in all those who
study it by the creative imagination itself, as it could not fail to be in a science that goes
to the last foundations of human knowledge, since all the operation of the human spirit
starts from the imagination, and imagination can only be captured by the
imagination"13. Conclusion: Even though it lacks any thematic scope14, pure imagination
proves to be the indispensable condition for exploring the themes raised by it.
2 We have now an indication – although a negative one - regarding how Rubens' book
about pure imagination in the Wissenschaftslehre interpreted the debate under way at
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University of São Paulo in the 1960s: at least as far as Fichte is concerned, if one only
worries with "purely textual analysis", it would mean understanding him wrongfully.
But which place does this conclusion reserve for philosophical activity in general?
At this point, a footnote in the first chapter of O Espírito e a Letra provides a good clue.
The context in which it is registered is that of Fichte`s debt with Kant’s Critique of
Judgment (1790), in particular with the concept of "Reflection", as it appears in the Erste
Einleitung. In fifth part of this text, reflection is presented by Kant as a condition for the
formation of concepts in general, which gives him the forefront in relation to formal
logic. We are therefore faced with the prerogatives of reflection; to qualitify it, Rubens,
in the footnote to which I was referring a moment ago, directs the reader to the
interpretation made by Gérard Lebrun in his doctorat d'Etat, defended in 1970 and
published in the following year, Kant et la fin de la métaphysique15. In this book Lebrun
defends that, with the 3rd Critique, Kant makes reflection the method of philosophy
itself. Therefore, because "properly speaking, there is no jurisdiction (Gebiet) in relation
to objects"16, the Critique of Judgment was capable of considering the unity between
freedom and nature. This would be the core of philosophical activity, understood as a
reflective exercise that, taken up and deepened by Fichte, will be built as a
"fundamental unit [of transcendental philosophy], from which the sensitive world and
the suprasensible world are differentiated''17. The conclusion that Rubens draws from
this is twofold. In Fichte`s plan of exegesis, he concludes that there has been a "system"
since the Grundlage of 1794 - but "system" understood with a specific and
unprecedented meaning, since the "knowledge" made possible by the Wissenschaftslehre
no longer relates to any objective region. If, as stated in the 3rd Critique, philosophy
corresponds to practicing "a-doctrinal"18 reflection, then Rubens concludes, "the
interest of the study by Fichte cannot be exactly in the themes he exploits. It is in that
which his philosophy intends, explicitly, to be constituted in a discourse that says
absolutely nothing, in a non-thematic science par excellence.'' It is therefore a non-
figurative philosophy19 which is definitely breaking with the meshes of Representation.
 
V
It is not difficult to discern there elements from the archeology of the human sciences
carried out in Les mots et les choses (1966) - and it is worthwhile to remember that M.
Foucault was in São Paulo in 1965, in order to "check'' with Lebrun the reading of Kant
he was going to propose in the famous Chapter IX on the empirical-transcendental
double. The presence of the Foucaultian interpretative scheme in Rubens' book, which
closely followed Lebrun's courses, is unequivocal - as attested, among others, by this
passage from Chapter III:
if  language leaves the sensible world intact,  it  is  not  because it  has the task of
describing  it  and  producing  it,  as  it  is  the  case  in  representation,  limited  to
redoubling  it  in  image,  but  because  it  is  used solely  as  means  for  guiding to  a
community that is beyond it. [VBF: that is where the issue of the communicability
of philosophy and, by extension, of public opinion as formulated by Illustration and
interpreted by Fichte is concerned]. From the beginning, when man sets himself to
imitate the world's sounds or to trace figures in the sand, what he `speaks' is not
the language of representation, but that of expression. Its goal is not to constitute a
classifying framework that  would contain the signs of  all  things;  emitting signs
means making known to the other that he designates his thoughts or expresses the
lion.20
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The expressive nature of language, then, brings to the foreground the metaphorical
nature of the discourse; and this, in its turn, reaffirms the central role of
transcendental imagination, not only for the Fichte`s philosophy, but also for a more
global understanding of philosophy as an essentially non-theoretical activity - in the
ordinary sense of theory, understood as an objective and impartial discourse about the
world. And that is because “communication is not made in the signs,but through them,
and every language, as the transition from the intelligible to sensible, operates only
through metaphors”21.
The approximation of Ruben’s interpretation on the role of the transcendental
imagination in Fichte stands out with M. Foucault’s investigations on the status of
philosophy. After the crisis of representation and after the critique to an unreflected
objectivity, ignorant of its presuppositions, philosophy, aware of its metaphorical
character, approximates itself to poetry and literature. This approximation, in its turn,
inscribes this interpretation of the Wissenschaftslehre on a highly discernible and active
interpretative line during the 60s in the Department of Philosophy of the University of
São Paulo, which, as mentioned above, was led by Lebrun, who was consulted by
Foucault on the preparation of the chapter on Kant in Les mots et les choses.
But would that be all — a Fichte which reminds us, back to the early 1970s, that
philosophy is a knowledge about nothing, a purely critical exercise? This would
certainly aligne Rubens Torres Filho with the refusal that Lévi-Strauss, L. Althusser, M.
Foucault and others made of the domain of Erlebnis, over which many philosophers had
erected their systems since the 30s. And this would be no small accomplishment. After
all, it is not so common for a brazilian monographic work to show such perfect
harmony with the french intellectual life, where during the 60s Foucault took the place
of Sartre as maitre à penser. But, by way of conclusion, it is worth at least highlighting
the proximity of the research by Rubens Torres Filho to two other interpretative lines
present in USP’s philosophy department, which is worth briefly mentioning.
First, it is worth recalling the investigations that Bento Prado Jr. (he also being a
professor of Rubens) had begun to carry out on the status of language in Jean-Jacques
Rousseau. Like Ruben Torres Filhos' Fichte, the Rousseau of Bento Prado Jr. emphasizes
the metaphorical and creative character of language22, against what postulate the
proponents of grammar’s utopia, which dismiss the discourse from each and every
particular determination, as if words immediately represented things. Rubens Torres
Filhos’ interpretation of the Von der Sprachfähigkeit und dem Ursprunge der Sprache (1795)
recovers this same critical theme.
But, perhaps more less evident, but no less important than the dialogue with M.
Foucault, G. Lebrun and Bento Prado Jr., is the debate that Rubens Torres Filhos’ book
establishes with the investigations that had been carried out by his professor and first
supervisor, José A. Giannotti. At that time, more precisely in 1965, Giannotti had
already defended his “Habilitation’s Thesis” about the philosophy of the young Marx,
entitled Origens da dialética do trabalho23. In the Book’s acknowledgments, Rubens Torres
Filho is mentioned — and I heard from Giannotti himself that, besides frequent
conversations, Rubens, his student at the time, typed up significant parts of the book at
his request. In order to understand what could have been this interlocution, it is worth
remembering the year of 1968.
In 1968, effectively, Giannotti published his famous article which would become very
important for marxist studies in Brazil "Contra Althusser"24, in which he refuted the 
epistemological cleavage proposed by the French philosopher. In the same year, Giannotti
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also published his translation of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, by Wittgenstein (São
Paulo, Ed. Nacional) - which is cited right at the beginning of Rubens Torres Filho's
book about the problem of expression in Fichte - a point that, as one can guess, has
become decisive for an understanding of the relations between the letter and the spirit
in Fichtean thinking, as presented by the interpreter25. The question that I am
interested in asking could be put in this way: what relationship could exist between
Giannotti's Marx and the Transcendental Imagination of the Fichtean philosophy, as
Rubens understands it? In other words, how does the reflection followed its course in
that moment of debate in São Paulo, from Marx to Fichte, going through Kant?
 
VI
If I am not wrong, it was Giannotti who introduced the term "reflexionante'' (the German
“reflektierend”) in the Brazilian philosophical lexicon, in the thesis defended in 1965
about the young Marx26. The main ideas of this book were mobilized in 1968 in the
polemic against Althusser — he who, as we know, introduced the notion of a
“theoretical practice” and, from it, instituted a separation between the orders of
concept and of reality. The intention was to make it possible for this "theoretical
practice" to take forward the knowledge of reality without interfering with the studied
reality. Nevertheless, objects Giannotti, the mirroring of reality by the abstract reality
"only becomes possible because a categorical constitution process occurs in reality
itself, that is opposed to the becoming of the phenomenon"; the essence of the
capitalist way of production and of the kind of social relationship associated with it, as
Giannotti had championed, is set up by this dialectic between discourse and reality.
There lies the open opposition to Althusser:
The essence is part of each moment of the concrete, without, however, exhausting its
dimensions, in a manner that the discourse would only become scientific when it
reproduced the order of this ontological constitution'27.
To paraphrase the text, a genuinely scientific discourse does not close itself or, at least,
it can only do justice to its cognitive pretension if it accompanies the movement of the
objects it intends to know in its categorical constitution. Thus, social science cannot
remain outside its object in its non-closure; on the contrary, the discourse is
inseparable from the representations’ historicity and that which is found in its basis -
the exchange operations, the processes by which "concrete men [...] transform certain
objects into the expression of others, inserting them into an eminently social
context."28
A similar understanding of social processes is taken up by Rubens in his approach to
Fichte - and this point, as far as the relationship between the spirit and the letter is
concerned, is essential to his interpretation. When commenting Fichte's warning,
according to which the determination of each proposition of his philosophy should be
explained only from the context and by acquiring a global vision (Übersicht) of the
whole, Rubens states:
(...) this primacy of the spirit and this insufficiency of the letter, apparently suitable
for minimizing the role of the exhibition, ultimately exacerbate the importance of
the letter: it is necessary to follow it carefully, not to interrupt it at any moment in
the name of a disclosure of the content, not to compete with any of its isolated
formulas, taking it as a key, since all of the text, in its tense fabric, works to attain
the  spirit,  absent  in  principle,  but  which  could  not  be  otherwise.  The
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communication, through a systematic construction of something that is beyond all
figuration, which is in life and not in image, demands this patient mediation work.29
Such inseparability between the spirit and the letter, which only reinforces the
function of mediating accomplished by the imagination, aligns Rubens Torres Filho's
Fichte with Giannotti's controversy against Althusser, insofar as Giannotti and Rubens
defend, each through its author, that all knowledge worthy of this name is dialectic
knowledge - that is (in Fichtean terms), a knowledge resulting from the inscription of the
spirit in the letter and its exposition in the latter. This departure to materiality is always
mediated by linguistic relations which, in the interior of determined social practices,
secure the communicability of its expressed contents. Hence the reason why, for us to
concentrate ourselves on Rubens Torres Filho’s Fichte, the letter has to be repeatedly
read and animated by the consciousness of each reader of the Wissenschaftslehre. It is as
a result of this point that the spirit can only be seized by the way in which it is
presented (Darstellungsweise) in the text that one has in his hands. If the spirit or the
letter is absent, the understanding becomes impossible. Thus, "conceiving" is
equivalent to "composing", and conception and composing make up a single operation,
made possible by transcendental imagination. In order to reassess Giannotti's text
against Althusser, that is apparently what he had in mind when he said that, from
German idealism to Marx, the Discourse is positional.
It is not the time to go further on these approximations, whose examination would also
demand inspecting the differences between these perspectives. Since the pair spirit/
letter is interchangeable with the opposition between form and matter, it is even more
tempting to approximate, through this approach the fichtean reflection hailed by
Rubens Torres Filho and the dialectical materialism pursued by Giannotti. But one
could also not ignore that Rubens Torres Filho’s approximation to the domain in which
moved M. Foucault and G. Lebrun produced a certain departure with that which, in
Giannotti’s perspective, would take him to the project of bringing forth an ontology of
the social grounded in the reflective caracter of the work. Let us, for the time being,
stay with these preliminary remarks about a local debate concerning the meaning and
scope of Reflection - a debate of which, as I hope I have pointed out, Rubens' book on
Fichte constituted a relevant moment which is worth being revisited.
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ABSTRACTS
My objective in this article is to discuss the interpretation on Fichte proposed by Rubens Torres
Filho in his doctoral thesis, entitled O Espírito e a Letra (The Spirit and the Letter) (1975), in which
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